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Bankruptcy

by Hon. James D. Walker, Jr.*
and Amber Nickell**
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2007 the world of bankruptcy law lacked much of the excitement
seen in 2005 and 2006. During the previous two years a variety of novel
issues and intra-circuit conflicts arose as courts began interpreting the
2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.1 The pace settled down in
2007 as courts began work that consisted more of refinement than
innovation. They tackled the scope of sovereign immunity, the automatic
stay, undue hardship for student loan discharge, and the hanging
paragraph in § 1325(a).2 These and other recent developments in
Eleventh Circuit bankruptcy law are addressed in this Article.
II.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

In 2006 the United States Supreme Court held that when the states
ratified the Constitution, they agreed to subject themselves to bankruptcy laws enacted by Congress. Consequently, the Supreme Court in
Central Virginia Community College v. Katz4 held that states cannot
raise sovereign immunity as a defense to preference suits, and bankrupt-
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1. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to Title 11 of the United States
Code or the United States Code Annotated (commonly referred to as the "Bankruptcy Code"
or the "Code").
2. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
3. Central Va. Cmty. College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 370 (2006).
4. 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
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cy judges may issue ancillary orders to enforce in rem jurisdiction.' In
FloridaDepartment of Revenue v. Omine (In re Omine),6 the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals considered the scope of Katz.!
In In re Omine, the Florida Department of Revenue ("DOR") raised the
questions of whether it could assert sovereign immunity when accused
of an automatic stay violation and whether it is subject to damages as
a result. After the debtors filed a Chapter 13 petition, the DOR filed a
proof of claim. The DOR subsequently began garnishing the debtorhusband's wages and was found to have been in violation of the stay.
The bankruptcy court awarded the debtors actual damages, attorney
fees, and punitive damages, and the DOR appealed. The district court
affirmed and remanded to the bankruptcy court with instructions. On
remand, the bankruptcy court awarded the debtors actual damages,
attorney fees, and sanctions (based on the debtors' new motions for
sanctions), and the district court affirmed.'
The court of appeals
affirmed in part and reversed in part.9
The Eleventh Circuit explained that Katz dealt with a preference
action, which requires the defendant (in this case, the State) to return
property belonging to the bankruptcy estate.' ° However, when damages are awarded for an automatic stay violation, the state must turn over
funds unconnected to the bankruptcy estate.11 In other words, the
DOR argued, it "allow[s] public funds held by a state treasury to be at
risk to benefit an individual," which the DOR claimed is not authorized
2
by Katz.'
The court of appeals disagreed, noting that the automatic stay is
essential to the bankruptcy process, and the court's authority to enforce
it flows from its in rem jurisdiction. 3 "While motions for contempt and
seeking sanctions that include attorney's fees and costs for violating the
automatic stay may resemble money damage lawsuits in form, it is their
function that is critical, and their function is to facilitate the [in rem]
proceedings that form the foundation of bankruptcy." 4 Consequently,

5. Id. at 373, 379.
6. 485 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2007).
7. Id. at 1313-14.
8. Id. at 1309-11.
9. Id. at 1320.
10. Id. at 1313.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (citing Small Bus. Admin. v. Rinehart, 887 F.2d 165, 168 (8th Cir. 1989); Katz,
546 U.S. at 356).
14. Id.
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orders enforcing the automatic stay are not subject to the defense of
sovereign immunity.15
However, Congress's power to pass bankruptcy laws includes the
power to limit the award of damages. 6 The decision in Katz did not
affect the applicability of 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(3), 17 which prohibits the
court from awarding punitive damages for a stay violation by a
governmental unit."8 Therefore, the court vacated the award of
sanctions and remanded the case for further proceedings. 9
III.

PROFESSIONALS

An unsecured creditor's claim may include contractual attorney fees
incurred for bankruptcy-specific post-petition services, according to the
Supreme Court in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific
Gas & Electric Co.20 Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America
("Travelers") had issued a bond to guarantee Pacific Gas & Electric
Company's ("PG&E") workers' compensation benefits. When PG&E filed
a Chapter 11 petition, Travelers filed a proof of claim. The parties
engaged in litigation over certain language in PG&E's Chapter 11 plan.
After the litigation was resolved, Travelers sought to recover attorney
fees as provided for in its surety contract with PG&E. The bankruptcy
court denied attorney fees, in accordance with the Ninth Circuit's Fobian
rule, because the parties had been litigating a bankruptcy issue rather
than an issue arising from their contract. 2' The district court and the
court of appeals affirmed.22
The Supreme Court reversed, determining there is no basis for the
Fobian rule in the Bankruptcy Code.23 First, the Court noted that "an
otherwise enforceable contract allocating attorney's fees (i.e., one that is
enforceable under substantive, nonbankruptcy law) is allowable in
bankruptcy except where the Bankruptcy Code provides otherwise."24
Second, the Court reviewed the circumstances under which a court can
disallow a claim and determined that a court can disallow a claim if one
of nine exceptions applies.2 5 In this case, only one exception was

15.
16.

Id. at 1314.
Id. at 1317.

17.

11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(3) (2000).

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

In re Omine, 485 F.3d at 1316-17.
Id. at 1319.
127 S. Ct. 1199 (2007).
Id. at 1202-03 (citing In re Fobian, 951 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1991)).
Id.
Id. at 1204-05.
Id. at 1204.

25.

Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
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relevant-whether or not the claim for attorney fees was enforceable
"'under any agreement or applicable law. ' '2 6 Because the bankruptcy
court did not determine whether the fees were enforceable under state
law, the Court reversed and remanded for additional proceedings."
Attorney fees were targeted from a different angle in Quarles & Brady
LLP v. Maxfield (In re Jennings),28 in which the Eleventh Circuit
emphasized the importance of transparency in Rule 2014 disclosures.29
A law firm representing eleven debtors in a consolidated bankruptcy
proceeding failed to disclose certain potential or actual conflicts among
the debtors on its Rule 2014 disclosure form. The conflicts related to
claims certain debtors had against other debtors. The attorneys argued
the conflicts were fully disclosed in various pleadings unrelated to the
Rule 2014 disclosure statement. The bankruptcy court found the law
firm's disclosure to be insufficient and held that all disclosures must be
listed in the 2014 form.3" "Bankruptcy courts are not obliged to hunt
around and ferret through thousands of pages in search of the basic
disclosures required by Rule 2014."'l Consequently, the court of
appeals affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling that the attorneys (1)
violated the disclosure rules, (2) should be disqualified, (3) should receive
no compensation, and (4) should disgorge any retainer they had already
received.32
IV.

ADMINISTRATION

In Martin v. Pahiakos (In re Martin),33 the Eleventh Circuit held that
a trustee can bind a debtor with a settlement agreement. 4 In In re
Martin, a creditor sued a debtor in state court and obtained a default
judgment. The debtor alleged deficiency of service of process and filed
a motion to set aside the default judgment. Thereafter, the debtor filed
a Chapter 11 petition. When the case was later converted to Chapter 7,
the trustee replaced the debtor as the real party in interest in the state
court action. As part of a settlement of that action, the trustee agreed
to waive defenses with regard to service of process defects and to
withdraw the debtor's motion to set aside default judgment. The

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)).
Id. at 1207.
199 Fed. App'x 845 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 847-48.
Id. at 848.
Id.
Id. at 849.
490 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1277.
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bankruptcy court approved the settlement agreement without objection
from the debtor. The trustee later abandoned any remaining interest in
the state court proceedings, and the debtor again asserted his improper
service defense."5 His efforts were rebuffed by the bankruptcy and
district courts, which both found that he was bound by the settlement
agreement and ordered compliance.36
The court of appeals affirmed, noting that the debtor never objected
37
to the settlement agreement despite notice and opportunity to do so.
The court also held that the settlement met all the criteria for preclusive
effect.3" First, it was entered by a court of competent jurisdiction-the
bankruptcy court-in accordance with due process. 39 The trustee's
subsequent abandonment of any remaining interest in the state court
case did not give the debtor a right to relitigate it, nor did it affect the
bankruptcy court's order approving the settlement.4 °
Second, the
settlement order was final, such that it was entitled to preclusive effect
because in a Chapter 7 case, no further orders (such as confirmation) are
necessary to determine the rights of all parties.4 Third, the parties to
the settlement agreement were the same parties to the state court
litigation, with the trustee standing in the debtor's shoes. 2 Fourth, the
causes of action were identical.43
V.

AUTOMATIC STAY

Two cases considered slightly different aspects of the limited
automatic stay as applied to a debtor who has had one case pending and
dismissed during the year prior to his or her current filing.44 In such
circumstances,
the stay expires after thirty days if not extended by the
5
4

court.

In In re Ajaka,4" the debtor's case was subject to a limited stay. The
debtor sought an extension, which was denied because the extension

35. Id. at 1274-75.
36. Id. at 1275, 1277.
37. Id. at 1276.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1276.
41. Id. at 1276-77.
42. Id. at 1277.
43. Id.
44. In re Ajaka, 370 B.R. 426 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007); In re James, 358 B.R. 816 (Bankr.
S.D. Ga. 2007).
45. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)(3) (West Supp. 2007).
46. 370 B.R. 426 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007).
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hearing was not held within thirty days of her bankruptcy filing.4 7 The
bankruptcy court also refused to impose a stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 362(c)(4) 48 because the plain language of the statute provides that it
applies only when the debtor had "'2 or more single or joint cases"'
pending and dismissed in the year prior to the current filing. 4s Nevertheless, the court determined that an extension was unnecessary
because, in accordance with the majority view, the limited stay only
terminates with regard to the debtor, not the property of the estate. 50
The issue in In re James5 1 was slightly different. The debtor in that
case was also subject to the limited stay, which the court refused to
extend.5 2 The debtor then argued that the need for an extension was
moot because the stay only expires with regard to creditors who initiated
action against the debtor prior to the current bankruptcy filing.53 The
court disagreed based on the plain language of the statute. 4 The
statute provides that the stay will expire "with respect to any 'action
taken"' by a creditor.55 "There is no temporal qualification on 'action
taken' that limits its application to past action."56 On the contrary, the
statute allows the court to extend the stay "as to 'any or all creditors."'5 7 Thus,
the court concluded that the need for an extension was
58
not moot.

VI.

CLAIMS

Paying a joint liability was a bad move for the creditor in Fibreboard
Corp. v. Celotex Corp. (In re Celotex Corp.).59 Celotex and Fibreboard

were found jointly and severally liable on several personal injury claims.
Celotex filed for bankruptcy, and Fibreboard paid the claims in full.
Consequently, the personal injury plaintiffs released Fibreboard and
assigned their claims against Celotex to Fibreboard. Fibreboard then
sought subrogation in Celotex's bankruptcy case. 0

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 428.
11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)(4) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
In re Ajaka, 370 B.R. at 428 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)(4)(A)).
Id. at 429.
358 B.R. 816 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007).
Id. at 817.
Id.
Id. at 818-19.
Id. at 819 (quoting 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)(3)(A)).
Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)(3)(A)).
Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)(3)(B)).
Id. at 821.
472 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1320.
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The subrogation provision of the Bankruptcy Code, § 509(a),6 allows
a party to seek reimbursement when it pays a claim on which it was
liable with the debtor.6 2 However, reimbursement is not available if
the party asserting subrogation received consideration for paying a
claim.63 In this case, the court held that the release of liability
constituted consideration to Fibreboard.64 "[Tihose who are primarily
liable for the entire debt and therefore receive the consideration for
payment of the whole amount of the claim[] may not bring subrogation
claims to recover the payment."65
VII.

ESTATE PROPERTY

Tax liability, a tax refund, and exemptions intersected in Jones v. IRS
(In re Jones).66 The debtor in In re Jones filed a Chapter 13 petition
and claimed an anticipated federal income tax refund as exempt. The
IRS set off the overpayment against an unpaid tax liability from 2002.
The debtor alleged that the set-off was improper because it interfered
with her exemption. The bankruptcy court disagreed.6 7
Courts are split three ways on the issue of whether the IRS may set
off an anticipated tax refund which the debtor has claimed as exempt.66
Under § 553(a),69 the Bankruptcy Code does not affect any right of
setoff, with some limitations not applicable in this case.7 ° However, the
majority view holds that setoff of exempt tax refunds is impermissible
because it conflicts with § 522(c),7 which bars a creditor from collecting
prepetition debt (with some exceptions) from exempt assets.7 2 According to the majority view, allowing a set-off would nullify § 522(c) and
interfere with the debtor's fresh start.7 The minority view allows
setoff because § 553(a) expressly states that nothing in the Bankruptcy

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

11 U.S.C. § 509(a) (2000).
Id.
In re Celotex Corp., 472 F.3d at 1321.
Id. at 1323.
Id. at 1322.
359 B.R. 837 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006).
Id. at 838.
Id. at 839.
11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
In re Jones, 359 B.R. at 839.
11 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2000).
In re Jones, 359 B.R. at 840.
Id.
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Code (Title 11) affects setoff.74 Therefore, § 522, which is in Title 11,
cannot affect the right of setoff.75
The court in this case adopted a third emerging view, which allows
setoff because the anticipated tax refund is not property of the estate
subject to exemption.7 6 The emerging view relies on the Internal
Revenue Code to determine a debtor is not entitled to any tax refund
until overpayments are credited to unpaid taxes.77 Because the debtor
has no interest in the refund until after setoff, the debtor cannot exempt
the portion of the refund subject to setoff."8
Exemptions played a different role in In re Mazon.7 9 In that case,
the debtors concealed nonexempt assets worth more than $600,000 and
fully dissipated the assets post-petition for the debtors' personal use.
The trustee sought to recover the value of the hidden assets by
surcharging the debtors' exempt property.8 0
The court noted that the Bankruptcy Code is silent on the issue of
surcharge, except with regard to the costs of preserving or disposing of
collateral to the extent it benefits the creditor secured by that collateral."1 However, bankruptcy courts have broad power to deal with
abusive conduct under § 105(a)8 2 as well as inherent authority to
protect the integrity of the bankruptcy system.8 3 "Clearly, failure to
disclose assets and the misappropriation of those assets falls squarely
within the types of problems with which a bankruptcy court must be
able to effectively deal." 4 Therefore, the court concluded surcharge
was an appropriate remedy within both its statutory and implicit
authority because it would prevent the debtors from effectively
exempting more property than allowed by law."
Finally, the court determined that under Florida law, the trustee could
not surcharge the debtors' homestead exemption because the debtors did
not use the hidden assets to acquire an interest in their homestead. 8

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 553(a)).
Id.
Id. at 841.
Id. at 840.
Id.
368 B.R. 906 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007).

80. Id, at 908.
81. Id. at 909-10 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

11
In
Id.
Id.
Id.

U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000).
re Mazon, 368 B.R. at 909-10.
at 910.
at 911.
at 912.
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However, the trustee could surcharge any other exemptions claimed by
the debtors.8 7
VIII.

AVOIDANCE

A trustee who recovers property through his or her avoidance power
is subject to § 550(d),"8 which provides that "[the trustee is entitled to
only a single satisfaction" in an avoidance action.8 9 In Dzikowski v.
Northern Thust Bank of Florida (In re Prudentialof Florida Leasing,
Inc.),9" the Chapter 7 trustee settled for $3.9 million in avoidance
actions relating to 377 transfers totaling $10 million. Among the
defendants to the settlement were the principals of the debtor, Mr. and
Mrs. New. The debtor had made eleven transfers to Northern Trust
Bank on behalf of the News. After settling with the News, the trustee
sought an additional recovery from the bank for the eleven transfers at
issue. The bank argued that because the trustee had already received
a partial recovery of the transfers via the settlement, any additional
recovery would violate the single-satisfaction rule.9 1
The court stated that the single-satisfaction rule precludes the trustee
from "obtain[ing] twice the full value of a fraudulent transfer by
recovering that value from both the initial transferee and a subsequent
transferee."9 2 And, after determining that application of the singlesatisfaction rule is made pursuant to federal rather than state law, the
court considered whether a settlement that only partially satisfied the
amount of the transfers prevented any further recovery.9" The court
stated, "We refuse to read section 550(d) as abrogating the right of a
trustee to collect the full value of a preferential or fraudulent transfer."94 The fact that one defendant makes a good settlement bargain
does not release a second defendant from liability.95 When multiple
claims are part of a settlement, the bankruptcy court must determine
the amount to be allocated to the transfer at issue.96 Such an allocation "will be necessary only when collateral litigation implicates the rule

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
11 U.S.C. § 550(d) (2000).
Id.
478 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1295-96.
Id. at 1297.
Id. at 1298-1301.
Id. at 1301.
Id. at 1302.
Id.
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of single satisfaction and, in most cases, only after liability has been
ascertained."9 7
Before a trustee can obtain any satisfaction, the trustee must prove
the elements of his or her claim." In Flatau v. Walman Optical Co. (In
re Werner),99 the trustee asserted a preference claim. The debtor's
principal used a credit card during the preference period to satisfy one
of the debtor's obligations. The trustee sought to recover the payment
from the creditor.'00 The primary issue in the case was whether the
credit card charge met the threshold standard for a preference action
by
"constitut[ing] a transfer of an interest of Debtor in property."1 1
Although the available balance on a credit card is not generally
considered estate property, the court likened the payment by credit card
to the situation in which a debtor obtains a cash advance and uses the
money to pay a creditor. 1 2 The debtor "initiated and directed the
transfer of funds from his credit card account to [the creditor],"
something he could only do if he had an interest in the money.10 3
Thus, the court concluded the transaction met the threshold test for a
preference.'o 4
IX.

A.

DISCHARGEABILITY

Taxes

05
The debtor and his wife in United States v. Jacobs (In re Jacobs)
enjoyed a lavish lifestyle at Amelia Island Plantation that included an
expensive home, luxury cars, country club membership, cosmetic
surgery, large charitable donations, and extravagant gifts to relatives.
Although the debtor filed tax returns every year, he had eight years of
unpaid federal income tax liabilities, for which he sought a determination of dischargeability. 1°'
At issue was whether the debtor had
"willfully attempted to evade and defeat the tax[es]," such that they
would be excepted from discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(1)(C).''
The

97. Id.
98. See Flatau v. Walman Optical Co. (In re Werner), 365 B.R. 283 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
2007).
99. 365 B.R. 283 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2007).
100. Id. at 284-85.
101. Id. at 285-86.
102. Id. at 287.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 490 F.3d 913 (11th Cir. 2007).
106. Id. at 916-19.
107. Id. at 919; 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C) (2000).
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bankruptcy court found in favor of the debtor, and the district court
reversed. 0 8
The Eleventh Circuit, in affirming the district court, first considered
whether the debtor acted "willfully.""°9 Willfulness requires "'affirmative acts to avoid payment or collection of taxes.""'0 In this case, the
affirmative acts were transfers the debtor made to various organizations
and family members for little or no consideration, as well as the deeding
of his house to his wife to avoid attachment of tax liens."'
The debtor could not defeat willfulness simply by timely filing his tax
returns."' The mental state necessary for willfulness can be alternatively described as "'knowing and deliberate' ' 3 or "'voluntar[y] and
intentional[].""' 4 Such a mental state can be present whether or not
5
the debtor files tax returns."
Furthermore, willfulness does not
16
require fraudulent intent."

In this case, the debtor was aware of his tax liability, yet he transferred large sums of money to charities and family. In addition, he
structured his salary and the mortgage on his home in ways that
prevented the IRS from looking to either for recompense.
Such
circumstances satisfyn 7the test for exception of taxes from discharge
under § 523(a)(1)(C).

In another tax case, Elkins v.IRS (In re Elkins),' the debtor timely
filed his 2001 federal income tax return, which was due by October 15,
2002, pursuant to an extension granted by the IRS. The return showed
a tax liability owed by the debtor. On October 14, 2005, the debtor filed
a Chapter 7 petition and sought to discharge his 2001 tax debt.1 19
A claim for income taxes for which a return was due "'after three
years before the date of the filing of the [bankruptcy] petition"' may be
discharged. 12
The debtor argued the three-year lookback period
should be determined by the number of days that had passed (3 years

108. In re Jacobs, 490 F.3d at 920.
109.
110.
2001)).
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 922.
Id. at 923 (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Fretz, 244 F.3d 1323, 1329 (11th Cir.
Id.
Id. at 923-24.
Id. at 924 (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Fretz, 244 F.3d at 1330).
Id. (quoting In re Griffith, 206 F.3d 1389, 1396 (11th Cir. 2000)).
Id.
Id. at 925.

117.

Id. at 925-27.

118.

369 B.R. 741 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007).

119. Id. at 742.
120. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
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x 365 days = 1095 days) as opposed to calendar years. 2 ' In his case,
because of a leap year, 1096 days had passed
between the due date of
122
his 2001 return and his bankruptcy filing.
The court disagreed with the debtor.123 It is presumed that Congress "'says ... what it means and means ... what it says. ' 12 4 In
this case, the statute's language refers to years, not days. 25 Whether
or not the period includes a leap year is irrelevant. 126 Because the
debtor filed his bankruptcy petition before three full calendar years had
expired since the
due date of his tax return, the 2001 tax debt could not
127
be discharged.
B.

Student Loans

The Eleventh Circuit has adopted the three-prong Brunner test12 for
determining the dischargeability of student loan debt. 29 Under that
test, the debtor must show (1) an inability to maintain a minimal
standard of living if required to repay the loan; (2) additional circumstances indicating the debtor's financial situation is likely to persist for
a substantial portion of the repayment period; and (3) a good faith effort
by the debtor to repay the loans. 3 ° In Educational Credit Management Corp. v. Mosley (In re Mosley),' 3 1 the court of appeals offered
some new guidance for applying the Brunner test.
In In re Mosley, a pro se debtor sought to discharge his student loans.
His primary evidence for the second (additional circumstances) and third
(good faith) prongs of the undue hardship test was his testimony about
a catalog of persistent mental and physical health problems that
prevented him from holding a job. The creditor sought to exclude the
debtor's testimony that his health problems prevented him from working
because such a conclusion was not corroborated by independent medical
evidence. The bankruptcy court allowed the testimony and found the

121. Id. at 743.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 744.
128. See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987)
(per curiam).
129. Hemar Ins. Corp. of Am. v. Cox (In re Cox), 338 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2003).
130. Id.
131. 494 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2007).
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student loans dischargeable.'3 2 The district court and the court of
appeals affirmed.'3 3
The court of appeals held that a debtor's testimony alone can be (but
is not necessarily always) sufficient proof.' "[Tihe crucial requirement
is that the debtor show how his medical conditions prevent him from
working, and this can be accomplished by an array of evidence, including
the debtor's credible testimony."3 ' In this case, the debtor's testimony
supported the bankruptcy court's finding of undue hardship. 3 '
The creditor also argued that the debtor showed a lack of good faith
by failing to enroll in the Income Contingent Repayment Program
("ICRP"), in which monthly payment is based on the debtor's ability to
pay, and any remaining balance after twenty-five years is discharged.'37 The court stated that failure to participate in the ICRP is
not per se bad faith. 3 ' Even when a debtor's monthly payment under
the ICRP is $0, "the Program is not always a viable option.... as it may
require [debtors] effectively to 'trad[e] one nondischargeable debt for
another' because any debt that is discharged under the program is
treated as taxable income."' 39 The Eleventh Circuit held there was no
error in the bankruptcy court's finding that the debtor made good faith
efforts to repay his loan despite his failure to enroll in the ICRP. °
X.

CHAPTER

13

A.

Right to Convert
In Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts,' the Supreme
Court resolved a circuit split over whether an individual debtor has an
absolute right to convert a case to Chapter 13.142 In Marrama a
Chapter 7 debtor made false and misleading statements about his
interests in real property. When the Chapter 7 trustee announced his
intention to procure the real property for the estate, the debtor filed a
motion to convert to Chapter 13. The trustee opposed the motion on the
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
2007)).
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1324.
at 1325.
(citation omitted).
at 1325-26.
at 1327.
(second brackets in original) (quoting In re Barrett, 487 F.3d 353, 364 (6th Cir.

Id. at 1328.
127 S. Ct. 1105 (2007).
Id. at 1107-08.
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ground that it was filed in bad faith. The bankruptcy court agreed with
the trustee and denied the motion. The bankruptcy appellate panel and
the court of appeals affirmed.143
In agreeing with the lower courts, the Supreme Court analyzed the
language of § 706(a) and (d).'" Section 706(a) provides that a Chapter
7 debtor "may convert a case under [Chapter 71 to a case under chapter
11, 12, or 13 of this title at any time."145 Section 706(d) provides, "[A]
of this title
case may not be converted to a case under another chapter
14 6
unless the debtor may be a debtor under such chapter."
The debtor argued that the right to convert set forth in § 706(a) is
absolute. 4 7 The Court disagreed, reasoning that the language granting a right to convert in § 706(a) is limited by the language in § 706(d),
so that the debtor can only convert to Chapter 13 if he or she has a right
to be a Chapter 13 debtor.148 The Court in Marrama noted that a
debtor does not qualify if his or her debts exceed the amount allowable
in Chapter 13 pursuant to § 109(e). 4 9 But, instead of focusing on
§ 109, the Court focused on whether or not a Chapter 13 case initiated
by the debtor would be subject to dismissal or conversion to Chapter 7
"for cause" pursuant to § 1307(c). 5 ° Bad faith or lack of good faith in
filing a Chapter 13 petition has been widely recognized by bankruptcy
courts as cause for dismissal or conversion.151 Although the Court
expressly declined to define bad faith, it noted that bad faith may
include fraud. 52
Thus, the Court concluded that a bankruptcy court may deny a
Chapter 7 debtor's motion to convert to Chapter 13 if that debtor has
engaged in fraud.153
[Tihe broad authority granted to bankruptcy judges to take any action
that is necessary or appropriate "to prevent an abuse of process"
described in § 105(a) of the Code, is surely adequate to authorize an
immediate denial of a motion to convert filed under § 706 in lieu of a
conversion order that merely postpones the allowance of equivalent

143.
144.
145.

Id. at 1108-09.
Id. at 1109-10; 11 U.S.C. § 706(a), (d) (2000).
11 U.S.C. § 706(a).

146.

Id. § 706(d).

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Marrama, 127 S. Ct. at 1110.
Id.
Id.; 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(e) (West Supp. 2007).
Marrama, 127 S. Ct. at 1110; 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) (Supp. V 2005).
Marrama, 127 S. Ct. at 1111.
Id. at 1111 & n.11.
Id. at 1111.
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relief and may provide 1 54
a debtor with an opportunity to take action
prejudicial to creditors.
The dissenting Justices argued that no language in the Bankruptcy
Code bars conversion due to bad faith. 1 55 Instead, they argued that
the language of § 706(d), barring a debtor from converting to Chapter 13
unless the debtor qualifies under that chapter, refers to the eligibility
requirements for Chapter 13 set forth in § 109(e). 15 6 While fraud or
other bad faith may subject a Chapter 13 debtor to a post-petition
dismissal, it does not affect the debtor's prepetition eligibility for
Chapter 13 pursuant to § 109(e). 15 7 Consequently, according to the
dissent, a court that denies conversion based on the debtor's bad faith
is in contravention of the language of the Bankruptcy Code.'
B.

ProjectedDisposable Income

Last year, we noted a trend among bankruptcy courts on the issue of
"projected disposable income" as applied to above-median-income
debtors.51 9 In the Eleventh Circuit, the bankruptcy courts were united
in finding the term to be forward-looking. However, some division on
the issue has emerged.16 °
Section 1325(b)(1)(B)"' requires a Chapter 13 debtor to pay unsecured creditors all of the debtor's "projected
disposable income to be received in the applicable commitment
period."1 62 Prior to the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code,
judges typically looked to the debtor's I and J schedules, which set forth
1 63
income and expenses, to determine disposable income.
Under the amendments, "disposable income" is defined as "current
monthly income received by the debtor ... less amounts reasonably
necessary to be expended" for the support of the debtor and his or her
family.'
In the case of an above-median-income debtor, "[almounts
reasonably necessary to be expended ... shall be determined in

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

159.

Hon. James D. Walker, Jr. & Amber Nickell, Bankruptcy, 58 MERCER L. REV.

at 1112 (footnote omitted) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000)).
at 1114 (Alito, J., dissenting).
at 1114-15.
at 1117.

1145, 1162-63 (2007).
160. See, e.g., In re Purdy, 373 B.R. 142 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2007); In re Arsenault, 370
B.R. 845 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007); In re Berger, 376 B.R. 42 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2007); In re
Miller, 361 B.R. 224 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2007).
161. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
162. Id.
163. Id. § 1325(b)(2).
164. Id.
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accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 707(b)(2)." 65
Both the current monthly income (average of the debtor's actual income
for the six months prior to filing) and the section 707(b)(2) 166 expenses-jointly known as the means test-are calculated by debtors on form
B22C. 67
In each of the cases on point, the debtors' disposable income as
calculated on form B22C was substantially less than their net income
reflected on schedules I and j.168 The courts in In re Berger169 and
In re Miller 70 held the means test calculation is dispositive regarding
the amount of a debtor's projected disposable income (the formula approach).'7' The courts in In re Arsenault 7' and In re Purdy17' held
the means test figure could be modified to take into account changed
174
circumstances (the forward-looking approach).
Under the forward-looking approach, courts reason that relying on the
means test calculation ignores the word "projected," thus rendering it
superfluous.175 Because "projected" by definition requires looking into
the future, courts must be authorized to look at the reality of a debtor's
76
income and expenses to determine projected disposable income.
Courts taking the formula approach counter that the forward-looking
approach has the effect of rendering the entire express definition of
"disposable income" extraneous.177 Furthermore, these courts allege
that the term "projected" is not ignored; rather, it simply instructs the
court to multiply the historical data by the applicable commitment
17
period.
As a second aspect of their rationale, forward-looking courts point to
the phrase "'to be received'" to support their position. 79 "As past
income is not 'to be received,' the language places emphasis on what the
debtor receives in the future. It also directly contradicts the use of any

165.
166.
167.
168.
B.R. at
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. § 1325(b)(3).
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (Supp. V 2005).
Walker, supra note 160, at 1162-63.
In re Purdy, 373 B.R. at 144; In re Arsenault, 370 B.R. at 847; In re Berger, 376
44; In re Miller, 361 B.R. at 225.
376 B.R. 42 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2007).
361 B.R. 224 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2007).
In re Berger, 376 B.R. at 48; In re Miller, 361 B.R. at 234.
370 B.R. 845 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007).
373 B.R. 142 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2007).
In re Purdy, 373 B.R. at 152; In re Arsenault, 370 B.R. at 852.
In re Purdy, 373 B.R. at 149; In re Arsenault, 370 B.R. at 849-50.
In re Purdy, 373 B.R. at 146; In re Arsenault, 370 B.R. at 850.
In re Berger, 376 B.R. at 47; In re Miller, 361 B.R. at 235.
In re Berger, 376 B.R. at 47.
-In re Purdy, 373 B.R. at 147 (quoting 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b)(1)(B)).
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calculation that would allow inclusion of income that a debtor is no
longer receiving. " "8 The formula courts suggest that "to be received"
may, instead, refer "'to the payments that will be received throughout
the life of the plan. '""'
Finally, the formula courts note the means test allows alteration of
income and expenses in special circumstances."' Thus, the formula is
not fixed in stone.
Regardless of which position the court takes, the debtor must still
grapple with the means test form as a starting point. In In re Morgan,1 3 an above-median-income Chapter 13 debtor paid no rent or
mortgage for his residence. Nevertheless, in computing his disposable
income, he claimed a mortgage/rent deduction of $911 pursuant to local
IRS standards. The trustee objected, arguing that only debtors who pay
84
rent or a mortgage can claim such a deduction.
Pursuant to § 1325(b)(3), the disposable income of an above-medianincome debtor is determined in accordance with the means test in
§ 707(b)(2). 8 5 Under the means test, "'The debtor's monthly expenses
shall be the debtor's applicablemonthly expense amounts specified under
the National Standards and Local Standards [which includes housing],
and the debtor's actual monthly expenses for the categories specified as
Other Necessary Expenses."'"86 At issue was the interpretation of the
phrase "'applicable monthly expense. ' ' ,11 The court noted a split of
188
authority on the issue.
Some courts interpret "applicable" to mean the debtor's "actual"
monthly expense. 89 The court in In re Morgan rejected that line of
cases for two reasons. 9 ° "First, these decisions look for guidance in
the IRS manuals," which is not authorized anywhere in the Bankruptcy
Code. 9 ' Second, these cases "fail to reconcile or explain the presence
of the word 'actual' later in the same sentence," which is used to refer to

180. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b)(1)(B)).
181. In re Berger, 376 B.R. at 47 (quoting In re Kolb, 366 B.R. 802, 817 n.19 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 2007)).
182. In re Berger, 376 B.R. at 45; In re Miller, 161 B.R. at 235.
183. 374 B.R. 353 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007).
184. Id. at 354-55.
185. Id. at 355 (citing 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b)(3)).
186. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)).
187. Id. at 357 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 358.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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deductions for certain other expenses.1 92 The court reasoned, instead,
that the word "applicable" refers to "'the National and Local Standards
that apply to a particular debtor as determined by the debtor's family
size and place of residence."" 9
Therefore, the court concluded, the
debtor was entitled to deduct the full housing allowance provided in the
local standards. 94 "Had Congress wished the Standards to act as a
cap rather than an allowance, it knew what language to use."'9 5
C.

Surrenderof 910 Collateral

Several courts addressed the consequences of a debtor surrendering
his or her car that falls within the scope of § 1325(a)'s hanging
paragraph (vehicle purchased for the debtor's personal use within 910
days prior to the bankruptcy filing, secured by a purchase money
security interest). 9 In each case, the debtor proposed a plan that
provided for surrender of his or her vehicle in full satisfaction of the
creditor's claim, with no deficiency claim allowed.' 97
The courts
reached the same conclusion, adopting the majority view that the car can
be surrendered in full satisfaction of the claim.198
Section 506199 -which provides for bifurcation of claims into secured
and unsecured portions based on the value of the collateral-does not
apply to claims subject to the hanging paragraph. °° Under § 1325(a)(5)(C),2"l the court may confirm a plan over the objection of a 20secured
2
creditor if the debtor surrenders the collateral to that creditor.
Courts in the minority-holding the creditor is entitled to a deficiency
claim-reason that § 506 is used to value the secured claim and is

192. Id.
193. Id. at 360 (quoting In re Naslund, 359 B.R. 781, 791-92 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2006)).
194. Id. at 362.
195. Id.
196. In re Vanduyn, 374 B.R. 896 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007); In re Williams, 369 B.R. 680
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007); In re Moon, 359 B.R. 329 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2007); 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 1325(a) (hanging paragraph, sometimes cited as § 1325(a)(*)).
197. In re Vanduyn, 374 B.R. at 897; In re Williams, 369 B.R. at 681; In re Moon, 359
B.R. at 330.
198. In re Vanduyn, 374 B.R. at 902; In re Williams, 369 B.R. at 682; In re Moon, 359
B.R. at 333. The majority view has been rejected by all the circuit courts to consider the
issue. In re Ballard, Nos. 07-5109, 07-5112, 2008 WL 2080852, at *5 (10th Cir. May 19,
2008); In re Long, 519 F.3d 288, 291 (6th Cir. 2008); Capital One Auto Fin. v. Osborn, 515
F.3d 817, 821-22 (8th Cir. 2008); In re Wright, 492 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2007).
199. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
200. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(a) (hanging paragraph).
201. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(a)(5)(C) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
202. Id.
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inapplicable when the collateral is surrendered. °3 These courts hold
that once a creditor receives its collateral, the creditor is entering the
bankruptcy case as an unsecured creditor entitled to press its deficiency
claim rather than as an undersecured creditor.0 4
According to the court in In re Moon,2"' the minority's reasoning is
flawed because "[w]ithout § 506, a 910 creditor has no statutory basis to
assert an unsecured claim after surrender of its collateral."2 °6 In fact,
the court noted, the hanging paragraph covers surrender because the
"'value [of a secured creditor's collateral and thus the amount of its
allowed secured claim] [is] to be determined in light of the purpose of the
20 7
valuation and the proposed disposition or use of such property.'
Similarly, any argument that the creditor is entitled to a deficiency
claim because the "validity and enforceability of a claim is determined
by non-bankruptcy law" is unpersuasive. 20 8 Not only does Congress
have the power to modify contracts, it can also preempt state laws that
conflict with bankruptcy laws. 0 9 It has done so with regard to 910
claims. 210 Thus, the hanging paragraph "permits debtors to surrender
a motor vehicle in full satisfaction of a debt owed to the secured creditor
and requires the creditor to forego the opportunity to take advantage of
the provisions of Section 506 should the property be liquidated for less
than the amount of the debt."2 '
D. Long-term Unsecured Debt
In 2005 Congress added a new subsection governing the contents of a
Chapter 13 plan to § 1322(b).2 12 The new language, codified at
§ 1322(b)(10), allows a debtor to pay post-petition interest on nondischargeable debt if the plan also provides for full payment of all allowed
claims.2 13 In In re Webb,214 the court resolved a conflict between the
new subsection and an existing subsection, § 1322(b)(5),21 ' which
allows a debtor to maintain payments on long-term debt. The debtors

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

In re Moon, 359 B.R. at 332.
Id. (citing In re Particka, 355 B.R. 616, 623-24 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006)).
359 B.R. 329 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2007).
Id. at 333.
Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Supp. V 2005)).
In re Vanduyn, 374 B.R. at 901.
Id.
Id. at 901-02.
Id. at 902.
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(10) (2005 & Supp. V 2005).
Id.
370 B.R. 418 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007).
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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in In re Webb proposed to maintain regular payments on their nondischargeable student loan debt, while paying only a one percent dividend
to their other unsecured creditors.2 16
The trustee objected to the plan because maintaining student loan
payments under § 1322(b)(5) necessarily requires the payment of postpetition interest in violation of § 1322(b)(10)."' Thus, the two provisions seem in conflict. In such a situation, principles of statutory
interpretation
dictate that the more
specific provision-§ 1322(b)(5)-controls. 21'
Applying that principle, the court
reasoned, "'[P]rohibiting the payment of interest on nondischargeable
debts would make the cure and maintenance of any long-term debt
impermissible. Such a result would be absurd and could not have been
intended by Congress."'2 19 Therefore, the court held that § 1322(b)(10)
does not apply to prevent a debtor from paying a debt in accordance with
§ 1322(b)(5).22 °
E.

Property Acquired Post-confirmation
In two cases debtors profited from causes of action that accrued after
their Chapter 13 plans were confirmed. In Waldron v. Meredith,22 ' the
court found the proceeds of the lawsuit to be property of the estate. 2
In In re Baxter,2 3 the court found the proceeds were vested in the
debtor, but they were considered disposable income such that the debtor
must modify his plan. 224 The courts differ on application of the court
of appeals decision in Telfair v. First Union Mortgage Corp.225 The
court in Telfair harmonized § 1306(a)(1), 226 which includes postpetition property as property of the estate and § 1327(b),227 which vests
property of the estate in the debtor upon confirmation of the Chapter 13
plan.228
The court adopted the estate transformation approach,

216.
217.

370 B.R. at 420.
Id. at 422.

218. Id. (citing In re Freeman, No. 06-10651-WHD, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3906 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. Dec. 22, 2006)).
219.

Id. (quoting In re Freeman, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3906, at *6).

220. Id.
221.

No. CV406-270 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 2007).

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228,

Id., slip op. at 2.
374 B.R. 292 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2007).
Id. at 296.
216 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2000).
11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1) (2000).
11 U.S.C. § 1827(b) (2000).
Id.
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holding that only property necessary to complete the plan remains in the
estate after confirmation.2 29
The court in Meredith distinguished Telfair, noting that Telfair dealt
with prepetition assets rather than assets acquired post-petition.23 °
The court explained that under Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc.,231 the
debtor has a duty to amend his or her schedules to add post-petition
assets. 2 Additionally, the Bankruptcy Code provides for modification
of a Chapter 13 plan.2 3 In light of the duty to amend and the ability
to modify, the court concluded that under Telfair, confirmation returns
all prepetition property not necessary for plan execution to the debtor.234 However, "Telfair did not hold that post-confirmation property
is retroactively vested in the debtor."2 31 It will only vest if it is
unnecessary to fulfillment of the plan.236
The court in In re Harvey23 7 acknowledged the debtor's duty to
disclose post-petition assets but stated that so long as the post-petition
assets are not necessary for completing the current plan, they are not
estate property.238 However, even though the assets are not estate
property, they may be considered in the disposable income test for
purposes of plan modification.2 39
XI.

CHAPTER 11

In Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias,Inc. (In re
Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.),240 the court of appeals considered whether
a pre-confirmation transfer was subject to a stamp tax.2 4' After filing
a Chapter 11 petition, the debtor auctioned its assets in a sale process
approved by the bankruptcy court. In February 2004 the court approved
the sale and, pursuant to § 1146(c), 242 determined it was exempt from
stamp taxes. The debtor did not propose a plan until more than a month

229. Telfair, 216 F.3d at 1340.
230. Meredith, No. CV406-270, slip op. at 5.
231. 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002).
232. Meredith, No. CV406-270, slip op. at 6-7 (citing Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1268).
233. Id., slip op. at 7 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
234. Id., slip op. at 8.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. 356 B.R. 557 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006).
238. Id. at 563.
239. Id. at 564.
240. 484 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 741 (2007).
241. Id. at 1301-02.
242. Id. at 1301. Section 1146(c) has been redesignated as § 1146(a). 11 U.S.C.
§ 1146(a) (Supp. V 2005).
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later. The court confirmed the plan in October 2004. The Florida
Department of Revenue argued that the stamp tax should apply to the
sale. The bankruptcy and district court disagreed.2 43 The court of
appeals affirmed the lower courts.244
Under § 1146(c), a transfer of assets "under a plan confirmed under
section 1129 of this title, may not be taxed under any law imposing a
stamp tax or similar tax."2 45 At issue in In re Piccadilly Cafeterias,
Inc. was whether the stamp tax would apply to a pre-confirmation asset
transfer.24 6 The court noted that the Third and Fourth Circuits both
determined that by its plain meaning, the phrase "'under a plan
Because preconfirmed ' ' 2 47 means "authorized by the plan."24
confirmation transfers are not authorized by the plan, these courts held
the transfers are not exempt from stamp tax.249
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, pointing to its previous interpretation
of § 1146(c) under a fact scenario concerning a transfer between two
The court explained that in In re TH. Orlando
nondebtors.25 °
Ltd.,251 it had held that the transfer must be authorized by a confirmed plan. 2 However, the court also held that "'a plan authorizes
253
any transfer that is necessary to the consummation of the plan.'
The court noted that § 1146(c) does not expressly require the transfer
to take place after confirmation of the plan.25 4 Imposing a temporal
requirement on transfers exempt from the stamp tax "ignores the
[A] debtor
practical realities of Chapter 11 reorganization cases ....
may need to close a sale as a condition precedent to the parties'
willingness to proceed with confirmation of a plan."25 Therefore, the
court held, "§ 1146(c)'s tax exemption may apply to those pre-confirmation transfers that are necessary to the consummation of a confirmed
plan of reorganization, which, at the very least, requires that there be
some nexus between the pre-confirmation transfer and the confirmed

243. In re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 484 F.3d at 1301.
244. Id.
245. 11 U.S.C. § 1146(c) (2000).
246. 484 F.3d at 1302.
247. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1146(b) (2000)).
248. Id. (citing In re NVR, LP, 189 F.3d 442, 456-68 (4th Cir. 1999); In re Hechinger
Inv. Co. of Del., Inc., 335 F.3d 243, 252-54 (3d Cir. 2003)).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1303.
251. 391 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2004).
252. In re Piccadilly Cafeterias,Inc., 484 F.3d at 1303 (citing In re T.H. Orlando Ltd.,
391 F.3d at 1291).
253. Id. (quoting In re T.H. OrlandoLtd., 391 F.3d at 1291).
254. Id. at 1304.
255. Id.
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plan." 25" The court of appeals will not have the last word on this issue,
because the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the
however,
7
case.

25

XII. CONCLUSION
Although 2007 was not a year for ground-breaking decisions in
bankruptcy law, 2008 may offer more interesting, if not always happy,
developments. Most notable is the prospect of new legislation spurred
by a faltering economy-specifically the decline in the housing market.
There has been much discussion of an amendment to the Bankruptcy
Code allowing individuals to modify residential mortgages. Whether
such a significant change will come to pass remains to be seen.

256.
257,

Id.
Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 741 (2007).

